Recent threats by the Bush administration to cut off billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan have sparked panic in government circles. Likewise, according to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, military strikes by the US aimed at Al-Qaida and Taliban havens inside Pakistan's tribal areas would destabilise Pakistan and possibly could bring General Pervez Musharraf down.
But how worried should the Pakistani authorities really be in the face of growing US pressure to root out Islamic militants? Occasional frustrations notwithstanding, it is, in fact, unlikely that the US will turn against a faithful and dependent ally, especially one whose leader enjoys cordial personal relations with Bush.
How does in Musharraf do it? The answer lies in a finely honed strategy, perfected over years, that juggles US demands and the interests of local intelligence chiefs, mullahs, tribal leaders, venal politicians, and a host of fortune seekers.
First, American impatience must be held in check. Pakistan is expected to deliver results on Al-Qaida and the Taliban. However, the pot is not to be emptied all at once. For example, when US vice-president Dick Cheney arrived in Islamabad in early March, threatening an aid cut and direct US action against Islamic militants, his message was not lost.
A second aspect of Musharraf's strategy is to create mutually beneficial relations with Islamists. This is a tricky business. Musharraf cannot permit the mullahs to become too strong.
The third element of Musharraf's strategy is more positive: he knows that he must do some good, and also be seen doing it. With the defeat of Al-Qaida and the Taliban, America's only visible goal, it is no surprise that the US remains enormously unpopular among Pakistanis, forcing Musharraf to maintain his perilous balancing act.
[The Times of India]
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